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Abstract—  This  paper  develops  an  original 
framework to better understand the interaction between 
the  development  of  brands  and  the  quality  of  raw 
materials. We consider different levels of consumer trust 
for a brand and we examine the incentive for firms to 
improve the quality of a processed product by requiring 
that  upstream  suppliers  adopt  a  private  standard.  In 
contrast to previous literature, the incentive for firms to 
develop a more stringent private standard may increase 
with  the  level  of  the  regulated  minimum  quality 
standard. Moreover, the creation of a private standard 
can  reduce  the  risk  of  consumer  dissatisfaction  while 
increasing  the  marketed  quantity.  Unexpected  positive 
effects  of  a  reinforcement  of  the  minimum  quality 
standard may arise, in the sense that both market access 
for  upstream  producers  and  consumer  surplus  are 
improved and final price may decrease with respect to 
simply complying with the regulation. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
As  in  any  industrial  sector,  the  development  of 
brands by agrifood firms results from the intention to 
meet  consumer  demand,  while  forming  the  basis  of 
product  differentiation  from  competitors.  Moreover, 
the  success  of  a  brand  depends  both  on  a  specific 
communication politics towards consumers and on the 
consumer trust in firm statements about the brand (see 
for  example,  the  seminal  works  in  the  marketing 
literature since Copeland, 1923). 
However, the brand success depends, above all, on 
the strategic manufacturing decisions, which are made 
according to the technological possibilities offered to 
firms. Brand development is thus highly depending on 
upstream  raw  materials  production  conditions,  from 
which the final product results. Therefore, the public 
regulation,  which  defines  the  standards  concerning 
raw  material,  may  be  sufficient  or,  on  the  contrary, 
insufficient  to  facilitate  this  strategy.  Hence,  firms 
might  be  lead  to  select  only  the  most  effective 
producers  or  also  to  encourage  their  suppliers  to 
upgrade upstream production conditions, through the 
creation  of  a  private  standard.  This  input’s 
normalization  strategy  often  corresponds to  more  or 
less  irreversible  investments  and  procedures 
(suppliers’  selection,  contracts’  setting,  norm’s 
development, product’s certification, etc.). It also may 
influence the firms’ short term decisions concerning 
quantity and price to adapt in fine to the evolution of 
demand  and  competition  environment  (see  for 
example, Maurer and Drescher, 1996, Ponssard et al., 
2005). 
This  paper  shows  how  a  medium-long  term 
strategic choice about the mode of input procurement 
influences  the  short-term  strategies,  which  may  be 
developed  by  the  firm  to  provide  the  brand’s 
development.  By  considering  different  contexts  of 
consumer  trust  in  the  brand,  we  thus  illustrate  the 
reasons why a firm would prefer the reinforcement of 
the upstream production condition and the conditions 
such that this strategy is implemented. Moreover, we 
show  that,  unlike  an  accepted  idea,  this  private 
standard strategy is not necessarily due to a laxity of 
the authorities in the definition of Minimum Quality 
Standards (MQS). 
Two examples in the agrifood sector may illustrate 
how  the  choice  of  a  brand  development  strategy  is 
strongly affected by both the level of MQS and the 
communication provided to final consumers: 
i) The wine represents an emblematic example of 
brand development in the presence of upstream MQS. 
In this sector, there exists a great number of MQS that 
– given the issues of sanitary safety or the respect of 
the  region  of  origin  –  mainly  concern  the  vine 
growers, which produce grapes or wine in bulk and   2 
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sell it to downstream processing and/or retailing firms. 
Within  the  European  Union,  an  important  part  of 
production concerns Appellations of Origin and some 
of  the  well  known  regional  ones  (like  Bordeaux  in 
France  or  Rioja  in  Spain)  stand  a  lack  of  brand 
development to compete on the international market.
1 
The influence of the production criteria requested for 
the  Appellations  of  Origin  is  often  considered  in 
explaining  this  feature.
2  One  of  the  most  frequent 
arguments, which is based on the increasing trend of 
brands in the “New World” (for example, E&J Gallo 
in  US  or  Jakob’s  Creek  in  Australia),  is  that  too 
constraining  upstream  production  conditions  are 
dissuasive for improving market strategies. That is the 
reason why a French firm as Pernod Ricard prefers to 
invest on a brand development strategy in Australia in 
order  to  avoid  the  too  constraining  regulations 
concerning  grape  production.
3  Nevertheless,  some 
vineyard  characterized  by  a  high  international 
notoriety  (like  Champagne,  Porto  or  Chianti)  have 
been  able  to  maintain  a  good  reputation  towards 
consumers. In these cases, brands are quite developed 
and  a  high  intermediary  price  has  allowed  the 
upstream producers to comply with relatively highly 
demanding production conditions
4. 
                                                            
1 According to Mora (2006), for several years now, Bordeaux's vineyards 
have suffered from what would appear to be an interminable crisis. Some 
analysts  view  overproduction  as  the  cause.  Others  blame  the  product 
Bordeaux  puts  out,  decrying  its  lack  of  adaptation  to  new  consumer 
expectations. The author argues that Bordeaux producers do not tend to 
spontaneously adopt a market orientation. See also ViniPortugal, Monitor 
Group  (2003)  for  an  analysis  of  the  wine  sector  in  Portugal  and  an 
illustration of strategies to improve competitiveness towards international 
markets. 
2  The  market  access  conditions  for  an  Appellation  of  Origin  are  often 
considered as MQS in the sense that the production of a wine outside the 
Appellation does not give access to the same markets and as far as an 
Appellation of Origin may represent a pertinent market. 
3 As illustrated by Green et al. (2006), the French group Pernod Ricard has 
largely invested on the international market, by developing wine brands as 
Jacob’s  Creek  (Australia),  Wyndham  Estate  (Australia),  Etchard 
(Argentina), Río de la Plata (Argentina), Long Mountain (South Africa). 
As illustrated by Pomarici et al. (2006) some of the leading Italian wine 
companies have invested abroad (expecially in US, Argentina and Central-
East Europe), see for example the strategy of Antinori with brands like 
Antica Napa Valley (California), Col Solare (Columbia Valley), Albaclara 
and Albis (Cile), or developed partnerships with foreign companies (see for 
example the one between the Italian Frescobaldi and the Robert Mondavi 
Corporation to create the brand “Luce”).  
4  See  Grazia  (2006)  for  an  illustration  of  the  evolution  of  production 
conditions in the Chianti (namely, with the creation of the Appellation of 
Origin “Chianti Classico” in 1996) and a strong increase in intermediate 
price corresponding to the production conditions’ reinforcement. 
ii) In the fresh products sector, a large development 
of high premium labels by retailers has been observed 
in  the  last  decade.  With  respect  to  the  wine  sector, 
described above, one of the main interesting issues of 
the supply chain management is given by the creation 
of private standards, which reinforce the MQS. These 
private  standards  have  been  usually  defined  in 
response to increasing food safety concerns, namely in 
the  meat  sector  (for  example  the  “Filière  Qualité 
Carrefour”, the “Traditional Beef” of Sainsbury or the 
“Selected Beef” by Mark and Spencer), but also for 
fruit  and  vegetables,  fish  and  seafood  or  cheese 
(Fearne, 1998). Specifically after the mad cow crisis, 
and despite the reinforcement of the MQS (such that 
the  prohibition  of  using  bone  meal  for  livestock 
feeding), the high premium labels in the meat sector 
have  been  largely  increased  in  the  EU  and  have 
involved an increasing number of upstream producers 
participating  in  the  brand  creation
5.  Developed  in 
periods characterized by a crisis of consumers’ trust, 
these strategies have reinforced the public regulation 
while  surprisingly  leading  to  an  improvement  of 
upstream  producer  market  access  (see  for  example 
O’Brien and Diaz Rodriguez, 2004). 
The objective of this paper is to illustrate some of 
these  economic  mechanisms  associated  to the  brand 
development. We propose an economic formalization 
of  the  creation  of  a  brand,  in  a  context  where  the 
upstream  production  conditions  are  normalized.  We 
thus refer to the specific case of the agricultural sector, 
where the upstream supply is fragmented if compared 
to the downstream processing and retailing sector. In 
this  model,  we  consider  a  downstream  firm  with  a 
monopolist  position  towards  the  final  market  and  a 
monopsonist position towards the upstream atomized 
supply.  Hence,  the  potential  suppliers  are  numerous 
and price-taker in their decision whether to participate 
in  the  intermediary  market.  Upstream  producers  are 
differentiated  according  to  their  equipments’  levels, 
which  in  turn  determine  the  quality  of  their  supply 
from the point of view of the consumers. Thus, the 
                                                            
5  The  Group  Carrefour  has  launched  the  first  FQC  in 1992  (la  “Boule 
Bio”). Today, this strategy concerns 245 supply chains (in France) and 74 
products  and  involves  35.500  producers.  About  40%  of  the  products 
concern the fruit and vegetable sector (Le Journal de Carrefour, 2005). 
With 200 suppliers in 1994, the production of the FQC fruit and vegetables 
has reached today a production of about 50.000 tonnes per year (Gaulet, 
2000). See also Aragrande et al. (2005) for an analysis of the European 
quality assurance schemes and implications on supply chain.   3 
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implementation of a MQS or a private standard might 
lead upstream producers to undertake investments in 
order to join the intermediary market. 
In this context, the downstream firm faces a quality-
quantity trade-off. That is, for a given level of quantity 
supplied  on  the  final  market,  an  increase  of  the 
standard  concerning  the  raw  materials  implies  a 
decrease  of  the  “risk”
6  associated  to  the  processed 
product,  whereas,  for  a  given  level  of  standard,  an 
increase  of  quantity  increases  the  risk  for  the 
processed product. As a result, the implementation of 
a private standard is likely to be necessary to avoid the 
negative effects of a high procurement quantity on the 
risk. Therefore, firms may have different strategies for 
brand development, which depends both on the level 
of MQS and on consumers trust in the brand. Namely, 
if the trust is relatively high the firm has two options: 
i) choosing to select only some of the initially well-
equipped producers, when the MQS is sufficiently low 
(what we denote by a "Strict selective strategy"); ii) 
choosing  to  select  the  initially  well-equipped 
producers  and  also  help  some  producers  to  upgrade 
their equipments to comply with the MQS, when this 
latter  is  higher  (what  we  denote  by  "MQS  adaptive 
strategy").  However,  if  the  consumers  trust  is 
relatively low, and even if the MQS is relatively high, 
we show the incentive for the firm to have a proactive 
role and set a private standard more constraining than 
the  current  MQS  (what  we  denote  by  "MQS 
reinforcing strategy"). Hence, we show that, it is not 
when the MQS is relatively weak that the firms have 
interest  in  substituting  to  the  public  authority  and 
implementing  a  private  standard.  Indeed,  the 
implementation  of  a  private  standard  leads  to  a 
reduction  of  the  risk  of  consumer  dissatisfaction. 
Hence,  the  processing  firm  can  benefit  from  an 
improvement of consumer willingness to pay and thus 
increases  the  marketed  quantity  of  the  processed 
product. We thus show that when the downstream firm 
has  interest  in  remunerating  the  upstream  producer 
compliance process, market access may be improved 
through  a  reinforcement  of  the  standard.  Moreover, 
                                                            
6  In this paper we use the term “risk” to specify the non-compliance of the 
processed product with respect to an expected quality. This terminology 
refers to the notion of “credence qualities” (Darby and Karni, 1973), which 
is  important  in  the  agrifood  sector,  especially  when  the  product 
normalization concerns the aspects of certification of origin or food safety 
(see for example, Grunert, 2005 and Loureiro and Umberger, 2007). 
consumers may be better off, both in terms of quantity 
and final price.  
We  thus  provide  an  original  contribution  to  the 
existing  agricultural  economics  literature.  A  large 
swathe of this literature examines the reasons for the 
development  of  private  quality  and  safety  standards 
and the effects of the level of MQS on the incentive 
for  firms  to  implement  private  standards.  The  main 
idea  is  that  firms  will  arguably  have  the  greatest 
incentive to implement private standards where there 
are  missing  or  inadequate  public  food  safety  and/or 
quality  standards;  here  private  standards  act  as  a 
substitute  for  missing  public  institutions  (Henson, 
2006;  Henson  and  Reardon,  2005).  In  this  spirit, 
Giraud-Héraud,  Rouached  and  Soler  (2006)  propose 
an  original  model  of  vertical  relationship  between 
producers and retailers which takes into account two 
supply sources: i) a competitive spot market on which 
the retailers by a MQS product and ii) supply contracts 
aimed at marketing higher quality private labels (PL). 
The authors take into account the negotiation power-
sharing between downstream and upstream firms. It is 
shown  that  if  the  MQS  is  relatively  too  high,  then 
retailer will not perceive any benefit in developing the 
PL. Nevertheless, this literature recognizes that even if 
public standards are well-developed and afford a high 
level of food safety and/or quality, there may still be 
an incentive to implement private standards. Then, the 
main  reason  to  argument  the  coexistence  of  private 
standards with highly demanding public regulation is 
given  by  the  necessity  for  the  firms  to  manage 
exposure  to  liability,  limit  exposure  to  potential 
regulatory  action  and/or  anticipate  future  regulatory 
developments  (Lutz  et  al.,  2000).  Despite,  we show 
how  the  incentive  for  firms  to  implement  a  private 
standard when public regulation is relatively high may 
result from the strategic behaviour of firms in terms of 
quality-quantity strategic choices in the context of a 
vertical relationship. Another set of contributions deals 
with  the  compliance  process  of  firms  to  a  process 
standard and, more specifically, with the related issue 
of  producers’  capacity  to  comply  with  it.  Thus,  the 
compliance  process  represents  a  long  term  decision 
and results in more or less high adaptation costs for 
firms  (Henson  and  Heasman,  1998).  Hence,  several 
contributions  examine  the  economic  implications  of 
standards  using  a  cost  and  benefit  analysis,  which   4 
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attempts to measure the cost for firms of implementing 
(food safety) regulations and compare it to the benefits 
in  terms  of  the  reduced  food  borne  illness  (see  for 
example Caswell and Kleinschmit, 1997; Antle, 1999; 
Viscusi, 2006). The main argument is that the more 
the standard is constraining, the higher is the risk of 
firms’ exclusion from the market. Hence, it is shown 
for example, that the compliance with standards may 
pose a greater burden on small firms, due to the large 
investments  needed  (Henson  and  Caswell,  1999, 
Unnevehr  and  Jensen,  1999).  Moreover,  even  if  a 
standard is not mandatory in the legal sense, it could 
be de facto mandatory (Henson, 2006). Hence, when a 
particular  set  of  products  or  specifications  gains 
market  share  such  that  it  acquires  authority  or 
influence, the set of specifications is then considered a 
de  facto  standard  (The  Nature’s  Choice  standard  of 
Tesco Stores PLC in the UK, that commands a market 
share  of  over  30  percent,  is  arguably  an  example). 
Even  if  standards  promulgated  by  private  entities, 
unless  referenced  by  regulations,  cannot  be  legally 
mandated, through market transactions such standards 
may become involuntary in practice; firms have little 
or no option but to comply if they wish to enter or 
remain  within  a  particular  market.  However,  the 
strategic behaviour of the downstream processing or 
retailing firm, namely the quantity strategy in response 
to consumer demand, may be positive for producers, 
even if the standard is reinforced. 
II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
We  consider  a  vertical  relationship  between  J  
upstream  producers  and  a  downstream  firm.  We 
assume that the downstream firm has a monopsonistic 
position  towards  upstream  producers  and  is  a 
monopolist on the final market. The firm buys  x  units 
of input in order to market a quantity  y  of output. 
Since each of the upstream producers is assumed to 
offer one unit of the input on the intermediary market, 
then the firm has to source from different producers in 
order to obtain the quantity  x  of input.  
A. Heterogeneity of producer equipments and risk of 
product failure 
Following  Giraud-Héraud,  Hammoudi  and  Soler 
(2006),  the  upstream  producers  are  differentiated 
according  to  their  “equipment”  level,  which  is 
represented  by  a  one-dimensional  parametere, 
assumed  to  be  uniformly  distributed  on  the 
interval[0,1] ,  according  to  the  density 
function f(e) 1 ≡ .  Namely,  the  equipment  level  e 
represents the technical level of the farm before the 
implementation of the standard. Thus, given the initial 
equipmente,  an  upstream  producer  who  wants  to 
supply the intermediary market must achieve at least 
the level  of  equipment s e ,  which corresponds to the 
“process standard” in force in the market. We consider 
that the compliance with the standard, for a producer 
of typee, implies a fixed cost, which is assumed to 
take a linear form s Max{0,e e } − . Namely, the cost of 
compliance is given by  s ( e e ) −  for a producer, whose 
level of equipment is lower than the standard and zero 
otherwise. Hence, given the heterogeneity of upstream 
supply, this cost function allows to explicitly take into 
account the heterogeneity of the compliance costs
7.  
We interpret the risk of product failure on the final 
market  as  the  probability  that  the  product  does  not 
meet  consumer  expectations.  The  risk  of  product 
failure  is  assumed  to  technically  result  from  the 
upstream  supply  characteristics,  whereas  the 
downstream is assumed not to influence the level of 
risk
8.  Namely,  the  heterogeneity  and  the  limited 
production  capacity  of  suppliers  implies  that  the 
probability of product success on the final market is 
altered (and the image of the brand is compromised) 
by the use of inputs, which do not meet the «ideal» 
production conditions expected by consumers (e 1 = ). 
Hence, we consider that the risk associated with each 
producer  of  typee,  is  affected  by  his  level  of 
equipment  and  is  given  by (e) σ ;  where  (.) σ   is  a 
decreasing function ofe. For the sake of simplicity, 
                                                            
7 For an illustration of this heterogeneity in the empirical literature, see for 
example Kleinwechter and Grethe, 2006. 
8 This assumption is crucial as regards the objectives of this paper. Namely, 
it makes it possible to isolate the influence that the downstream firm may 
have on the actual level of risk through its strategic behaviour (namely, 
short term quantity/price choice), regardless of the influence that the firm 
may have from a technical point of view.   5 
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we  consider  that (e) 1 e σ = − .  Hence,  the  individual 
risk is maximal when the producer is characterized by 
the minimum level of equipment; otherwise the risk is 
zero. Hence, each producer contributes with (1 e) −  to 
the risk of product failure on the final market. 
B. Downstream processing stage 
The  processing  stage  may  concern  processing, 
preserving,  conditioning  or  packing  operations.  The 
downstream  firm  converts  the  raw  material  into  a 
finished  product  according  to  a  fixed-proportions 
production  function.  Here,  we  consider  that  the 
downstream  firm  does  not  influence,  through  the 
processing operations, either the risk or the number of 
units sold.  
We denote by e ɶ  the threshold of equipment starting 
from which producers are selected by the downstream 
firm.  Hence,  the  firm  always  selects  the  producers 
characterized by equipment between  e ɶ  and 1, that is, 
the best level of equipment. The firm is assumed to 
buy x units of input and convert them into y units of 
finished  product,  according  to  the  fixed  proportion 
production  function y T( x) = ,  where  we  simply 




= − ɶ   (1) 
Since  we  consider  that  each  producer  always 
supplies the same quantity (one unit) of product (non-
elastic  individual  supply),  the  Benchmark  situation 
(when
s 0 e = ) is then defined by the following quantity 











  (2) 
Expression (2) represents the quantity bought and 
sold by the downstream firm and the associated risk of 
product  failure  when  no  MQS  is  in  force.  When  a 
MQS is implemented, the initial probability of product 
failure given by (2) may change if at least one of the 
producers upgrades his equipment. Thus, the density 
f (e) will shift to a density f '(e) and change the level 
of σ  with respect to (2). 
C. Risk perception and trust in the brand on the final 
market 
Consumers identify the firm’s product through the 
brand. The communication on the product’s attributes 
is  provided  either  by  the  firm  or  by  third  parties 
(certifiers,  consumer  guides,  etc.).  We  consider  that 
the  effects  of  this  communication  on  consumer 
purchase decisions depend on the degree of consumer 
trust, which in turn affects the level of perceived risk. 
Let us detail these mechanisms. 
Firstly,  consumers  are  assumed  to  be  imperfectly 
informed about the product’s attributes, in the sense 
that they react to the perceived probability of product 
failure rather than to the actual one. The concept of 
risk perception includes all the risks associated with 
consumer choices at the point-of-purchase. Indeed, as 
highlighted  by  McCarthy  and  Henson  (2005),  risk 
perception concerns not only the health (for example 
fat  content)  or  safety  (for  example  food  poisoning) 
risks associated with the product, but also the chance 
that  the  product  may  not  meet  taste  expectations, 
money is wasted, a poor meal is served to guest, etc. 
Hence, this concept relates to the perception of both 
the  probability  of  product  failure  and  the  negative 
consequences  of  buying/using  a  product  or  service. 
Consumer perception of the risk may be influenced by 
perceived  product’s consistency, interest  in  cooking, 
interest in the product, experience and confidence in 
purchase  location  (McCarthy  and  Henson,  2005), 
health loss, followed by psychological, financial, time 
and  taste  losses  (Yeung  and  Yee,  2002).  As  a 
consequence,  consumers  may  underestimate  or 
overestimate the risk of product failure, with respect to 
the actual level of risk.  
Secondly,  the  perceived  risk  of  product  failure  is 
assumed to be affected by the degree of trust in the 
brand. Hence, as highlighted by Delgado-Ballester and 
Munuera  Alemán  (2000),  trust  in  a  brand  can  be 
defined as “a feeling of security held by the consumer 
that  the  brand  will  meet  his/her  consumption 
expectations”.  It  is  noteworthy  that  the  process  by 
which  an  individual  attributes  a  trust  image  to  the 
brand is based on his/her experience with that brand. 
Hence,  trust  will  be  influenced  by  the  consumer’s 
evaluation of any direct (e.g. trial, usage, satisfaction 
in the consumption) and indirect contact (advertising, 
word  of  mouth,  brand  reputation)  with  the  brand   6 
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(Keller,  1993;  Krishnan,  1996).  Moreover,  trust  is 
based  on  the  two  general  dimensions  of  brand 
reliability and brand intentions towards the individual, 
which involve the role of time. The first dimension is 
related  to  the  assumption  that  the  brand  has  the 
required capacity to respond to the consumer needs, 
for  example,  by  offering  the  new  products  that  the 
consumer may need or by a constant quality level in 
its offering (Deighton, 1992). The second dimension is 
concerned with the belief that the latter is not going to 
take  opportunistic  advantage  of  the  consumer 
vulnerability  (Michell  et  al.,  1998).  Given  these 
premises,  we  focus  on  the  perceived  risk-reducing 
effect of the brand trust, this latter being interpreted as 
an exogenous market (demand side) condition
9. 
Finally, the level of perceived risk affects the extent 
to which consumers react to a communication on the 
product’s  attributes.  In  a  context  of  asymmetric 
information, the main approach taken by consumers to 
reduce the perceived risk experienced at the point-of-
purchase  consists  in  enhancing  the  probability  of 
product  success  through  the  use  of  “risk  relievers”, 
that  is  “a  piece  of  information  that  increases  the 
likelihood of product success” (McCarthy and Henson, 
2005;  Mitchell  and  McGoldrick,  1996)
10.  These 
authors  show  that  consumers  characterized  by  the 
highest level of perceived risk (“sceptic consumers”) 
tend to use more frequently extrinsic risk relievers to 
decrease the probability of product failure. When risk 
relievers are given by the information provided either 
by the firm or by third parties and the perceived risk is 
determined by the level of trust, ceteris paribus, the 
lower the trust in the brand, the higher the consumer 
reaction  to  a  communicated  decrease  of  the  risk  of 
product  failure,  in  terms  of  willingness  to  pay 
(marginal effect). 
Hence,  following  Polinsky  and  Rogerson  (1983), 
we  consider  that  in  the  end  market  consumers  are 
identical and we denote by  (1 ) λ σ −  each consumer's 
perception  of  the  actual  level  of  risk  of  product 
                                                            
9 If the level of trust would exclusively depend on the action of the firm, 
then the firm would choose the highest level of trust, which corresponds to 
the highest consumer willingness to pay for a given quantity. A different 
result may arise if the costs associated to the construction of brand trust are 
considered. Moreover, a further contribution to this analysis may results 
from the assumption on a level of trust depending on the level of standard 
in previous periods of time. 
10 See also Mitchell and Greatorex (1990) for an analysis of risk relievers 
in the UK food market.  
failureσ . The parameter λ  is interpreted as a measure 
of  the  extent  of  consumer  trust  in  the  brand, 
with [ 1,1] λ ∈ − . Hence, the aggregate inverse demand 
for the product, when the perceived risk is( 1 ) λ σ − , is 
given by:  
p ( ,l, ,x ) (1 ) l x λ α σ α λ σ = − − −   (3) 
Following  (3),  both  the  information  about  the 
likelihood of product’s success and the consumer trust 
affect consumer willingness to pay, for a given level 
of quantity. Namely, given the mechanisms illustrated 
above, the lower the degree of trustλ , the higher the 
perceived risk of product failure and the stronger the 
consumer reaction to a communicated decrease of the 
risk. In equation (3), the parameter  l  represents the 
monetary  loss  for  consumers  for  each  unit  of  the 
product that fails
11. We assume that  α  is sufficiently 
high, namely  J 2l α > +  (HP1)
12. 
D. The game 
Given the MQS  0 e  set by the public authority in the 
long term, we consider the following game.  
Stage  I.  The  firm  chooses  the  level  of  private 
standard  1 0 e e >  or 1 0 e e = . 
Stage II. The firm decides the quantity x of inputs to 
purchase  (stage  I.1).  The  firm  then  chooses  N 
upstream  producers  ( N J ≤ )  and  proposes  an 
intermediary price ω  in order to obtain the quantity  x  
(stage I.2). The N producers accept or reject this offer 
and upgrade their equipment if necessary (stage I.3). 
Stage III. The firm converts the obtained inputs into 
a finished product and sells it to the end market. 
The game is solved using backward induction. We 
firstly  analyze  the  firm’s  short  term  quantity/price 
choice, given a standard s e . In this sense, we place the 
analysis in the context of the traditional literature on 
MQS which aims at analyzing the effects of MQS on 
                                                            
11  According  to  McCarthy  and  Henson  (2005),  two  dimensions  of 
perceived risk can be distinguished, namely the perceived probability and 
the importance of loss to the individual. 
12 This first assumption is obtained as follows. The final price given by (3) 
is positive, for any given level of quantity, if and only if (1 ) l x α λ σ > − + . 
Given that i)  x J ≤ , ii) the risk varies from 0 to 1 and iii) the degree of 
trust is assumed to vary from -1 to 1, the final price is positive for any 
given level of quantity and in any context of trust considered, if and only if 
the parameter α  is sufficiently high, that is:  2 J l α > + .    7 
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the  firm’s  strategic  behaviour  (see  for  example 
Ronnen, 1991; Crampes and Hollander, 1995; Scarpa, 
1998)  by  considering  that  the  MQS  is  exogenous, 
rather than explicitly consider the endogenous choice 
of a MQS which maximizes social welfare
13. Hence, 
we illustrate the effects of the standard on the strategic 
behaviour of the firm in terms of quantity/price and 
the  related  effects  on  the  risk,  on  the  number  of 
upstream producers selected and on consumer surplus. 
Turning  to  the  first  stage  of  the  game,  we  then 
examine the decision of the firm whether to implement 
or not a private standard which reinforces the MQS set 
by the public authority. In this sense, we refer to the 
literature dealing with the analysis of the incentive for 
firms to implement private standards, according to the 
level of MQS (see for example, Henson, 2006; Henson 
and Reardon, 2005). As only one product is sold on 
the  market,  only  one  standard  can  be  operational. 
Hence, the standard  s e  required on the intermediary 
market may be either a MQS (when 1 0 e e = ) defined 
by  the  public  authority  or  a  private  standard 
implemented by the firm (when 1 0 e e > ).  
The paper is organized as follows. In section III, we 
provide an analysis of the firm’s quantity/price choice, 
given the level of MQS. In section IV, we examine the 
decision  of  the  firm  whether to implement  or  not a 
private standard which reinforces the MQS set by the 
public authority.  
III. EFFECTS OF THE MQS ON THE STRATEGIC 
CHOICE OF THE FIRM 
In this section, we analyze the firm’s quantity/price 
choice  and  the  related  effects  on  the  level  of  risk, 
upstream  producer  participation  in  the  market,  final 
price and consumer surplus, given the MQS. 
                                                            
13 Even if a few contributions consider the endogenous choice of the MQS 
(see for example, Ecchia and Lambertini, 1997), the choice of the criterion 
for  determining  the  MQS  is  a  very  complex  issue.  Hence,  there  exist 
several criteria for the definition of a MQS, especially in the agricultural 
sector.  In  addition  to  the  traditional  criteria  of  maximization  of  social 
welfare, other criteria could represent the public authority’s concerns, as 
for example the minimization of the risk, especially in the case of product’s 
safety, or the minimization of upstream producers’ exclusion. Following 
the main swathe of the economic literature on MQS, we thus examine the 
effects  of  the  level  of  MQS  on  the  firm’s  strategic  behaviour,  on  the 
average quality provided on the market and on the surplus of the other 
economic agents, without specifying the criterion of choice of the MQS. 
A. Producer compliance process with endogenous risk 
We denote by  s ˆ x J(1 e ) = −  the quantity demanded 
by  the  firm,  whereby  all  the  initially  well-equipped 
producers are selected ( s e e = ɶ ). Using (1), we verify 
that  s e e ≥ ɶ  if and only if ˆ x x ≤ . The quantity choice of 
the firm (that is, the relative position of the requested 
quantity  x   with  respect  to ˆ x )  thus  determines  the 
relative position of  e ɶ  with respect to the standard s e . 
Given that, the firm’s quantity choice may result in the 
following  two  scenarios,  according  to  whether  the 
firm’s short term quantity strategy requires an upgrade 
of  upstream  production  characteristics  or  not  (we 
define more precisely these scenarios below). 
On the one hand, if the quantity selected by the firm 
is relatively low, that is  ˆ x x ≤  ( s e e ≥ ɶ ), then the firm’s 
quantity  choice  does  not affect  upstream  production 
characteristics.  Namely,  if  ˆ x x <   ( s e e > ɶ ),  then  the 
firm selects only some of the initially well-equipped 
producers, while refusing some initially well-equipped 
ones, namely those located between  s e  ande ɶ . Hence, 
when  ˆ x x ≤   no  selected  producer  has  to  modify  his 
equipment in order to supply the intermediary market. 
As  a  consequence,  the  statistical  distribution  of 
producer  equipment  on  the  interval  [e,1] ɶ   is 
unchanged with respect to f (e) 1 ≡ .  
On the other hand, if the quantity selected by the 
firm  is  relatively  high,  that  is ˆ x x > ,  then  the  firm’s 
quantity  choice  affects  upstream  production 
characteristics. Namely, the firm also involves some 
initially not well-equipped producers in order to obtain 
the  quantity  x   ( s e e < ɶ ).  As  a  consequence,  the 
producers, who are initially located between e ɶ  and  s e  
have to upgrade their equipment in order to supply the 
intermediary market. The statistical distribution then 
changes with respect to  f (e) and is given by f '(e):  
es
e e s s
es
0 if e e
f '(e) e if e










ɶ   (4) 
We now detail how the firm’s strategy influences 
the  risk,  depending  on  whether  it  requires  an   8 
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upgrading  of  upstream  production  characteristics  or 
not. We denote by  ( , ) s e x σ  the risk for a given level of 
standard  s e   and  for  a  quantity x .  The  equipment 
distribution depends on the type of strategy chosen by 
the firm; we denote by  h(e) this distribution, where 
h(e) f (e) =  if  ˆ x x ≤  and  h(e) f '(e) =  if ˆ x x > . Using 





























  (5) 
As illustrated by expression (5), when ˆ x x ≤ , since 
the  firm  does  not  have  any  influence  on  upstream 
supply characteristics, the risk is not affected by the 
standard s e .  Conversely,  when ˆ x x > ,  then  the  firm 
procurement  strategy  determines  an  equipment 
upgrading for the producers who are initially located 
between  e ɶ  and s e . As a consequence, the level of the 
standard  s e  has an influence on the risk. In both cases 
illustrated by (5), the risk is an increasing function of 
the  quantity.  The  reason  is  that  an  increase  of  the 
quantity  requested  on  the  intermediary  market 
implicitly  leads  to  an  increase  of  the  number  of 
producers involved and namely to the involvement of 
more and more under-equipped producers. Hence, the 
expression (5) illustrates the existence of a quantity-
risk trade off in the following sense. Namely, the risk 
increases in quantity, for a given level of standard s e , 
whereas it decreases when the standard is reinforced, 
for a given level of quantity.  
B. Intermediary price 
Since we consider that the downstream firm has a 
monopsonist  position  towards  upstream  producers, 
then  it  has  complete  negotiation  power  in  the 
definition of the intermediary priceω . The firm thus 
sets the quantity  x  by anticipating the necessary price 
in order to obtain this quantity  x  (see Xia and Sexton, 
2004,  for  the  original  modelling  of  this  decision 
process).  The  analysis  is  developed  by  the  two 
following  assumption,  supported  by  the  empirical 
evidence so that individual contracts rarely exist in the 
agrifood  sector  (see  for  example,  Royer,  1998)  and 
intermediate  price is  usually  negotiated  between  the 
retailer  and  the  Producers  Organizations  and/or  the 
cooperatives and rarely between the processing and/or 
retailing firm and each of the upstream farmers (see 
for  example,  Malorgio  and  Grazia,  2007,  for  an 
analysis of the role of Producers Organizations in the 
implementation of EurepGap by fruit and vegetables 
farmers, Kleinwechter and Grethe, 2006).
14  
First, we assume that the intermediary price is the 
same for all the producers, regardless of their initial 
level of equipment. Hence, the downstream firm does 
not  have  the  possibility  to  discriminate  between 
upstream  producers.  Note  that  this  assumption  is 
consistent  with  the  absence  of  individual  contracts 
since with different intermediary prices, each producer 
would  choose  the  highest  price.  Second,  if  the 
requested quantity is relatively low, the firm will only 
select producers whose equipment is better than the 
standard  ( ˆ x x ≤ );  otherwise  –  and  given  that  the 
production capacity of each producer is limited – the 
firm will be forced to also source from initially under-
equipped producers ( ˆ x x > ). This assumption is also 
consistent  with  the  existence  of  an  intermediary 
organization who can select the producers who want to 
participate to the collective transaction. 
Thus,  if ˆ x x ≤ ,  the  firm  anticipates  that  all  the 
selected producers enter the market without any cost 
and can obtain the quantity with a zero intermediary 
price. Conversely, when ˆ x x > , the producers initially 
located  between  e ɶ and s e have  to  invest  in  better 
equipment ( s e e < ɶ ). In particular, the producer located 
in  e ɶ is  the  last  (less  equipped)  producer  who 
upgrades his equipment by investing s e e − ɶ . Hence, he 
does  not  agree  to  participate  in  the  market  if  the 
intermediary  price  is  lower  than s e e − ɶ .  In  order  to 
obtain the optimal quantity of input, the downstream 
firm  proposes  a  price  so  that  the  less-equipped 
producer can participate in the market. Thus, using (1), 
the intermediary price  s (e ,x) ω  is given by: 
                                                            
14  We  have  voluntarily  left  out  the  explicit  formalization  of  the 
intermediation  assured  by  the  Producers  Organization,  with  which  the 
downstream  firm  negotiates  (as  shown  by  empirical  evidence).  Indeed, 
taking into account this intermediary in the model would not change either 
the analysis or the qualitative results.   9 
12
th Congress of the European Association of Agricultural Economists – EAAE 2008 
s
s
ˆ 0 if x x
(e ,x) x











  (6) 
In  the  first  scenario,  whereas  all  the  producers 
located  within  the  interval  s [e ,1]   would  agree  to 
enter the intermediary market, the firm exerts at the 
maximum level its monopsonist power by refusing the 
producers, whose equipment is lower than e ɶ .  
Otherwise,  if ˆ x x >   then  the  firm  chooses  an 
intermediary price s (e ,x) ω , so that the less equipped 
producer participates in the market. As a consequence, 
for a given quantity, the higher the standard, the higher 
the compliance cost of the less equipped producer, the 
higher  the  intermediary  price.  Moreover,  a  direct 
consequence of the absence of price discrimination is 
the  existence  of  a  positive  externality  for  all  the 
producers, whose equipment is higher thane ɶ . 
C. Standardization, optimal quantity and effect on the 
risk 
We now characterize the firm’s expected profit. For 
a  degree  λ   of  consumer  trust,  the  firm’s  expected 
profit  s (e ,x) λ π  as a function of the standard  s e  and 
the quantity x , is given by: 
s s s (e ,x ) [ p ( ,l, (e ,x),x ) (e ,x )]x λ λ π α σ ω = −   (7)  
Where the risk  s (e ,x) σ  is given by (5), the final 
price  s p ( ,l, (e ,x),x ) λ α σ   is  obtained  by  substituting 
(5) into (3) and the intermediary price is given by (6). 
Hence, the objective of the firm is to maximize the 
profit, given by (7), according to the quantity x . As 
illustrated  by  (7),  the  quantity  choice  affects  the 
expected profit in different ways. On the one hand, the 
lower  is  the  quantity,  the  lower  is  the  intermediary 
price, for a given level of standard. On the other hand, 
the lower is the quantity, the higher is the final price. 
This latter result is given both by a rarity effect (direct 
effect of quantity on price) and by the risk-reducing 
(and  WTP-increasing)  effect  of  a  quantity  decrease. 
The magnitude of this indirect effect of quantity on 
price depends both on the actual level of risk and on 
consumer trust. 
Using  (7),  we  then  maximize  the  expected  profit 
s (e ,x) λ π   with  respect  to  the  quantity x ,  given  the 
standard s e . For every degree of trustλ , and given the 
standard s e ,  we  show  that  there  exist  two  levels  of 
equipment,  e   ande ,  decreasing  inλ ,  such  that  the 
optimal quantity 
*
( ) s x e λ  chosen by the firm is given 
by (see section 2 in the Appendix for details):  
*
J e e e s
J e e e e s s s
e e e s s
[1 ] if
x (e ) [1 ] if
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− − + +
  (9) 
We  can  verify  that  (e ) 1 e λ Ψ = −   and  thus  the 
optimal quantity choice of the firm is continuous in s e . 
The  two  levels  of  equipment,  e   and  e   are  two 
thresholds  that  identify  the  relative  position  of  the 
optimal quantity with respect to ˆ x . In order to examine 
the firm’s strategy in all the possible cases, we place 
the  analysis  in  a  context  of  the  parameters 
whereby0 e e 1 ≤ < < ,  by  assuming  (see  details  in 
Appendix) that  2J α ≤  (HP2). Furthermore, in order 
to be consistent with (HP1), we pose  J 2l >  (HP3), 
which is also consistent with the assumption of price-
taker upstream producers.  
IV. MINIMUM QUALITY STANDARDS AND 
BRAND DEVELOPMENT 
The  selection  and  remuneration  of  upstream 
producers  result  from:  (1)  the  exercising  of  both 
upstream  and  downstream  market  power  by  the 
downstream firm within the vertical relationship; we 
thus examine the influence of the public regulation on 
the  downstream  firm’s  strategy  concerning  the 
selection  of  upstream  producers  and  on  the 
mechanisms  governing  the  definition  of  the 
intermediary  and  final  prices;  (2)  an  imperfect 
consumer information about the actual level of health   10 
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risk; the perceived risk does not always correspond to 
the  actual  one  and  does  not  always  reflect  the 
downstream firm’s effort to improve food safety.  
Hence, the level of producer exclusion depends not 
only on the standard, but also on the strategic reaction 
of  downstream  firms  towards  both  the  final  market 
(supplied  quantity  according  to  the  degree  of 
consumer trust) and the upstream producers (selection 
and price paid to suppliers). Indeed, we highlight some 
unexpected  effects  of  the  standards.  Namely,  the 
number  of  upstream  producers  involved  does  not 
necessarily decrease in the standard; i.e. we show that 
when  the  downstream  firm  has  interest  in 
remunerating  the  upstream  producer  compliance 
process, it increases the number of producers involved 
in order to implement its optimal strategy in the end 
market (increase in quantity). Moreover, we highlight 
that  the  actual  contamination  risk  is  not  necessarily 
decreasing if the standard is reinforced (see Figure 3).  
Given a certain level of food safety regulation, the 
short  term  quantity/price  reaction  of  firms  (and  the 
effect  on  the  risk,  this  latter  being  endogenous), 
depends  on  the  anticipation  of  consumer  behaviour 
(affected by the level of trust). Hence, the analysis of 
the  effectiveness  of  food  safety  regulation  cannot 
neglect  the  strategic  behaviour  of  a  firm  as  regards 
both  the  upstream  producers  and  the  final  market. 
Namely,  when  the  risk-decreasing  effect  of  a 
standard’s reinforcement is amplified by a relatively 
low degree of trust, the firm has interest in increasing 
the  supplied  quantity  to  benefit  from  the  enhanced 
willingness to pay-increasing effect. 
The  firm  has  thus  interest  in  remunerating  the 
upstream  producer  compliance  process  and  in 
increasing  the  number  of  producers  involved. 
Nevertheless,  the  involvement  of  an  increasing 
number of initially under-equipped producers implies 
an increase of the health risk, even though the standard 
is  reinforced  (for  a  more  detailed  analysis  of  the 
effects of the MQS on the strategic behaviour of the 
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Figure 2 - Effects of the standard on the risk of product 
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We now examine the firm’s choice of the strategy 
for the development of the brand. Namely, given the 
MQS  0 e  set by the public authority and turning to the 
stage  1  of  the  game,  we  now  identify  at  which 
conditions the firm has incentive to implement a more 
stringent private standard. Hence, given the degree of 
consumers’  trust,  we  determine  to  which  extent  the 
long term strategic choice of the firm is affected by the 
level of MQS set by the public authority.    11 
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The possible strategies that may be selected by the 
firm are illustrated by the following Definition. 
Definition  1.  A  strategy  for  the  development  of 
brand is denoted: 
-  “Strict Selective” strategy, if the firm selects 
only some of the initially well-equipped producers; 
-  “MQS-adaptive” strategy,  if the  firm  simply 
complies with the level of MQS set by the public 
authority; 
-  “MQS-reinforcing”  strategy,  if  the  firm 
reinforces the MQS with a more demanding private 
standard. 
As  illustrated  by  the  Definition  1,  the  firm  may 
select  only  some  of  the  initially  well-equipped 
producers, being implicitly more demanding than the 
public  authority,  but  without  remunerating  an 
upgrading of upstream supply characteristics. On the 
other  hand,  firm  may  be  prompted  to  support  the 
equipment upgrading of upstream producers, with or 
without reinforcing the level of MQS. Hence, the firm 
may  simply  comply  with  the  level  of  MQS,  by 
supporting the compliance process of the initially not 
well-equipped  producers  through  a  positive 
remuneration, or be explicitly  more demanding than 
the public authority by implementing a more stringent 
private standard. As specified in section 1, as only one 
product is sold on the market, either the MQS or the 
private  standard  may  be  operational  in  the  market. 
Hence, if a MQS-reinforcing (MQS-adaptive) strategy 
is  implemented,  only  the private  standard  (MQS) is 
operational.  
The firm’s decision whether to reinforce the MQS 
set by the public authority is influenced both by the 
context of consumer trust and by the level of MQS set 
by the public authority. Indeed, both of these factors 
influence the short term quantity/price effects of the 
long  term  firm’s  strategic  choice  and  are  thus 
anticipated by the firm in setting its strategy for the 
development  of  the  brand.  Given  the  optimal  short 
term quantity/price strategy (illustrated in the previous 
section), we now detail, the conditions, at which the 
firm is encouraged to reinforce the level of MQS and 
the effects of the long term firm’s strategic choice on 
the short term quantity/price decision and on the risk. 
Proposition  1  -  There  exists  a  level  of  MQS  0 ˆ e , 
increasing  inλ ,  such  that  the  firm  chooses
*
1 0 e e > , 
with 
*
1 e 1 = , if and only if  0 0 ˆ e e > .  
As illustrated by Proposition 1, it is not necessarily 
when  the  MQS  is  relatively  weak  that  the  firm  has 
interest  in  substituting  to  the  public  authority  and 
implementing a more stringent private standard. In this 
sense, we depart from the established idea that private 
standards generally act as a substitute for missing or 
inadequate public regulation (Henson, 2006; Henson 
and Reardon, 2005). We show that this result directly 
arises from the strategic behaviour of the firm, both 
towards the intermediary and the final market.  
Proposition 2 – When the firm reinforces the MQS, 
then it improves both the likelihood of product success 
and quantity, with a positive effect on both consumer 
surplus  and  the  number  of  upstream  producers 
involved.  
At the conditions such that the firm has incentive to 
implement a more stringent private standard, then both 
quantity  and  quality  are  improved,  with  respect  to 
simply complying with the MQS. Hence, consumers 
are better off (in terms of quantity and likelihood of 
product  success)  and  producer  market  access  is 
improved.  Departing  from  the  main  results  of  the 
literature  (Henson  and  Heasman,  1998;  Henson  and 
Caswell, 1999, Unnevehr and Jensen, 1999), we show 
that,  when  the  downstream  firm  has  interest  in 
remunerating  the  upstream  producer  compliance 
process,  market  access  may  be  improved  through  a 
reinforcement of the standard. 
As  illustrated  by  Proposition  1,  the  degree  of 
consumer trust plays an important role in the analysis. 
Namely,  the  switching  level  of  MQS  ( 0 ˆ e )  is  an 
increasing function of the degree of trust. This means 
that, the lower the trust, the higher the incentive for 
the firm to reinforce the MQS. 
Definition 2 – There exist two levels of consumer 
trust  λ   andλ ,  with 1 1 λ λ − < < < ,  such  that
15, 
                                                            
15 Here, we place the analysis in a context of parameter such that the three 
contexts of trust arise. Since we consider a level of trust which varies from 
-1 to 1 and given the assumptions HP1, HP2 and HP3, we then assume that   12 
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consumers are denoted: i) “Optimists” if the degree of 
trust is relatively high (λ λ > ); ii) “Concerned” if the 
degree  of  trust  is  intermediate  (λ λ λ < < );  iii) 
“Sceptic”  if  the  degree  of  trust  is  relatively  low 
(λ λ < ). 
In the spirit of McCarthy and Henson (2005), we 
thus identify the following situations: (1) If consumers 
are  Sceptic  (λ λ < ),  the  firm  has  always  interest  in 
reinforcing  the  MQS  and  always  sets 
*
1 e 1 = ;  (2)  If 
consumers  are  Concerned  (λ λ λ < < ),  the  firm  has 
interest in reinforcing the MQS only if this latter is 
sufficiently  high;  (3)  If  consumers  are  Optimist 
(λ λ > ), the firm has never interest in reinforcing the 
MQS. 
 
Figure 3 – Firm’s strategy for the brand development 
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“MQS-reinforcing” strategy
“Strict selective” or “MQS-adaptive” strategy  
If  consumers  are  Sceptic,  the  firm  has  always 
interest in reinforcing the MQS, by anticipating that 
with a zero-risk consumer willingness to pay will be as 
high  as  possible  (α ),  for  any  given  quantity.  This 
means  that  the  same  “ideal  situation”  occurs  as  if 
                                                                                                   
the  monetary  loss  is  sufficiently  high,  so  that  the  condition  1 λ > −   is 
always verified (see Appendix for details). 
consumer  trust  were  maximal.  Hence,  the  firm 
reinforces  the  MQS  to  increase  quantity.  Moreover, 
the  increase  of  quantity  increases  the  number  of 
producers involved, consumer surplus and may result 
in  a  decrease  of  final  price,  provided  that  trust  is 
sufficiently low.  
If  consumers  are  Optimists,  the  firm  never 
reinforces the MQS. If the MQS is relatively weak (or 
no  MQS  is  in  force),  the  firm  chooses  a  “Strict-
selective” strategy. For a moderate level of MQS, the 
firm  maintains  the  “Strict-selective”  strategy  by 
decreasing  quantity  with  respect  to  the  Benchmark. 
Let us now explain this strategic behaviour of the firm. 
When the MQS is weak, the firm is not constrained in 
her quantity strategy, with respect to the Benchmark. 
When the level of standard rises above the threshold e  
(a switch from weak to moderate regulations), the firm 
should  finance  the  equipment  upgrading  of  initially 
not well-equipped producers in order to maintain the 
same  quantity ( ) x e .  As  a  consequence,  the  firm  the 
firm  prefers  to  reduce  the  supplied  quantity  (with 
respect to ( ) x e ), regardless of the degree of trust, in 
order  to  improve  willingness  to  pay,  rather  than 
remunerating  upstream  producer  compliance  to  the 
standard. The final price thus increases both through 
the standard’s reinforcement (decrease of the risk) and 
the “rarity effect”. For a relatively strong MQS, the 
firm  begins  to  remunerate  upstream  producers,  thus 
reducing  its  monopsonistic  power  towards  the 
intermediary  market.  The  firm  has  incentive  to 
decrease  quantity  in  order  to  both  improve  WTP 
(reinforcing  the  risk-reducing  effect  of  a  standard’s 
reinforcement)  and  decrease  the  intermediary  price, 
for  any  given  level  of  quantity.  This  behaviour  is 
reinforced  in  the  particular  case  whereby  trust  is 
maximal. Hence, in this case, the standard no longer 
affects the WTP. Moreover, when trust is sufficiently 
high,  a  strong  regulation  always  implies  a  quantity 
restriction and a higher final price, with respect to the 
Benchmark.  Thus,  even  if  food  safety  is  improved 
with respect to the Benchmark, it might be better not 
to regulate from the point of view of consumers, both 
in terms of quantity and final price 
If consumers are Concerned, the firm has interest in 
implementing a more stringent private standard only 
when the MQS is sufficiently high. Namely, when the   13 
12
th Congress of the European Association of Agricultural Economists – EAAE 2008 
level of MQS rises above 0 ˆ e , highly constrained in its 
procurement strategy, the firm reinforces the MQS by 
implementing  the  risk-minimizing  standard  so  that 
quantity  can  be  increased.  Both  the  number  of 
upstream  producers  involved  and  the  consumer 
surplus increase. Nevertheless, consumers are always 
worse off in terms of price. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Our paper provides an original contribution as we 
explicitly  consider  how  both  public  and  private 
policies are affected by consumer information about 
the average quality provided on the market.  
We  have  studied  the  incentive  for  the  firm  to 
develop private standards, more constraining that the 
minimum quality standard set by the public authority, 
in a context where product attributes are signalled to 
consumers  (either  by  the  firm  or  by  third  parties) 
through  a  communication  based  on  the  product’s 
average quality. We have shown that when consumer 
trust is relatively low and even if the MQS is relatively 
high,  the  firm  has  interest  in  developing  a  more 
constraining private standard, in order to increase the 
supplied  quantity.  In  addition,  empirical  evidence 
shows an increasing use of global business to business 
(B2B) standards in procurement from suppliers and as 
a governance tool in the food system, which are not 
communicated  directly  to  consumers.  In  general, 
investments in quality or quality control mechanisms 
are seen as a way to build consumer trust and increase 
the  value  of  a  firm’s  reputation,  once  signalled  to 
consumers. But why do firms exceed the legal MQS, 
when quality signals are not transmitted to consumers, 
such as use of EurepGap, or GFSI standards? At first, 
providing  consumers  with  products  that  meet 
consistent quality and safety standards that go beyond 
the minimum requirements builds reputation, the key 
asset for current and future earnings flows (Fulponi, 
2006).  Secondly,  major  processors  and  retailers 
implement  private  standards  as  instruments  for  the 
coordination  of  supply  chains  by  standardizing 
product  requirements  over  suppliers  (Henson  and 
Reardon, 2005). This becomes of greater importance 
as supply chains become more global and cut across 
differing  regulatory,  economic  and  regulatory 
environments.  Private  standards  may  thus  be 
implemented in order to reduce the transaction costs 
and risks associated with procurement. Thirdly, firms 
may be prompted to develop private standards in order 
to limit exposure to potential regulatory action and/or 
anticipate future regulatory developments (Lutz et al., 
2000) and manage exposure to liability. Our analysis 
could thus be extended by considering that the public 
authority  jointly  uses  ex-ante  regulation  (MQS)  and 
ex-post  liability  rules. The  existence  of  an  expected 
sanction  associated  with  product’s  failure  and  the 
consequently risk of market share erosion in the long 
term  is  thus  likely  to  incentive  firms  to  implement 
private  standards,  even  if  they  are  not  signalled  to 
consumers.  
Moreover,  in  this  paper  we  have  explicitly  taken 
into  account  the  role  of  vertical  relationships,  by 
considering that the MQS is applied to the upstream 
firms,  whereas  the  downstream  firm  maintains  the 
strategic  flexibility  to  choose  both  quantity  and 
quality, given that the upstream supply complies with 
the MQS. Hence, empirical evidence shows that MQS 
often  concern  intermediate  products.  In  a  context 
where  the  risk  arises  both  from  the  upstream 
production conditions and from the strategic behaviour 
of the downstream firm, the MQS may have different 
effects whether it is applied to the upstream suppliers 
or to the downstream firm. This extends our analysis 
in the larger debate about the optimal public policy 
between  “obligation  of  means”  and  “obligation  of 
results”. In the latter case, the MQS is applied to the 
downstream  firm,  which  is  thus  constrained  in  the 
quality-quantity choice by a level of average quality 
fixed by the public authority. The question raised is 
thus  whether  the  firm  has  interest  in  developing  a 
private  standard  and  which  are  the  effects  of  the 
different policy instruments on social welfare. 
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